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MONETARY POLICY WITH FLEXIBLE
EXCHANGE RATES AND FORWARD
INTEREST RATES AS Th4DICATORS
ABSTRACT
In the new situation with flexible exchange rates, monetary policy in Europe will have
to rely more on indicators than previously under fixed rates. One of the potential indicators, the
forward interest rate curve, can be used to indicate market expectations of the time-paths of
future short interest rates, monetary policy, inflation rates and currency depreciation rates. The
forward rate curve separates market expectations for the short, medium and long term more easily
than the standard yield curve. Monetary policy in France, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden and
the United States is interpreted with the help of forward rates.
Lars E. 0. Svensson




CEPR and NBER1. Introduction
Previous monetary policy with fixed exchange rates in Europe the last few years can
be described, with some simplification, as Germany's pursuing an independent monetary
policy directed as domestic price stability, and the rest of the countries' pegging their
exchange rate to the German mark, the European anchor currency. This was the case for
the countries within the ERM as well as the countries outside the ERM that unilaterally
pegged their exchange rate to the mark, as Austria, or the ecu, as Finland, Norway and
Sweden. Monetary policy outside Germany was then in principle very simple, it consisted
solely in defending a fixed exchange rate towards the mark or the ecu. This in turn, again
with some simplification, implied that central banks had to set interest rates so as to
roughly balance capital flows.
The last year's turmoil in Europe has dramatically changed this. The Finnish markka,
the Italian lira and the British pound were forced to float in September 1992. In November
the same year the Swedish krona was floated, in December the Norwegian krone. In
August 1993 the exchange rate bands for the currencies that remained in the ERM were
increased to percent, with the exception of the German mark and the Dutch guilder
which remained in the narrow band.
The loss of the fixed exchange rates means the loss of the nominal anchor for the
countries that used to peg their exchange rates to the mark or the ecu. Except for
Austria and the Netherlands, fixed exchange rates do not now seem, a realistic alternative
for the European countries in the short or medium term. Even if fixed exchange rates
towards a stable currency were feasible, if the ultimate target for monetary policy is price
stability, one can seriously doubt the efficiency of fixed exchange rates as an intermediate
target to achieve price stability (see Svensson (1994)). Hence, for several reasons there
is a need to discuss how monetary policy should he designed in the new situation with
flexible exchange rates in Europe.
This paper briefly discusses the design of monetary policy with flexible exchange rates,
in terms of the convenient and generally accepted conceptual framework of goals, inter-
mediate targets, indicators and instruments of monetary policy. It argues that likely
difficulties in finding appropriate intermediate targets will increase the role of indicators
for assessing the state of the economy, the stance of monetary policy, and how the in-
struments should be adjusted to achieve the goal of monetary policy. Several indicators
wifl have to be used simultaneously. The paper extends on the use of one of the possi-
ble indicators, the forward interest rate, and discusses how forward interest rates can be
Iused to extract market expectations of future interest rate, inflation rates andcurrency
depreciation rates. Some discussion and interpretation of forward interest rates in France,
Germany, Great Britain, Sweden and the United States is provided)
The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 discusses the design ofmonetary policy
with flexible exchange rates in terms of the conceptual framework of goals, intermediate
targets, indicators and instruments. Section 3 provides definitions of yields to maturity,
zero-coupon interest rates (spot rates) and forward interest rates. Sections 4, 5 and 6
discusses how forward interest rates can be used to extract expected future interestrates,
expected future inflation, and expected future currency depreciation, respectively. Three
different risk premia (term, inflation, and foreign exchange riskpremia) are defined and
discussed. Section 7 provides a comparison and discussion of forward interestrates in
France, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden and the United States. Section 8 concludes.
Appendix A reports on the estimation of forward rates from bond yields, and Appendix
B defines three related concepts of term prernia.
2. Monetary Policy with Flexible Exchange Rates
A generally accepted conceptual framework for the design ofmonetary policy distinguishes
between goals, intermediate targets, indicators and instruments(see Friedman (1990)or
McCallum (1990), for example).2 As the term implies, the goals ofmonetary policy—price
stability and full employment, for example—are the ultimate objectives ofmonetary policy.
Monetary policy is complicated by the fact that the central bank has onlyvery indirect
control over the variables that usually constitute the goals. These variablesreact with long
and variable lags to monetary policy. The variables themselvesare observed with some-
times rather substantial delays, at rather long intervals, and withsubstantial statistical
uncertainty. Some central banks select intermediate targets such as variousmoney-supply
aggregates or the exchange rate. These intermediate targets do not necessarily haveany
intrinsic value, apart from their correlation with thegoals. They are more controllable
and more readily observed than the goals (theyare observed more often, with less time
lag, and react more quickly to monetary policy).Properly chosen intermediate targets
can therefore contribute to fulfilling the goals. Indicatorsare variables that provide the
'Forward interest rates are already used as one of themonetary policy indicators by Bank of England,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, andSveriges Rikshank. Their role as indicatorsis
discussed in Bank of England (1993b), Svensson(1993a) and Sveriges Riksbank (1993). See also Bank
for International Settlements (1993,p. 144).
2This section builds to some extentupon Svensson (1992).
2central bank with information on the state of the economy (inflation pressure and inflation
expectations, for example) or on the monetary policy stance (that is, how expansive the
monetary policy is). Indicators thus offer the central bank guidance on how monetary
policy should be conducted in order to achieve the goals. Depending on the design of the
monetary policy, a variable may be an indicator or intermediate target. To illustrate, the
exchange rate is an intermediate target when fixed, but an indicator when flexible. As a
rule, the indicator function of a variable ceases if the variable becomes an intermediate
target. Short and long interest rates, credit volume, employment and wage settlements
are other examples of indicators. Finally, instruments- such as the interest rate at which
the central bank lends reserves to private banks, or the monetary base or somecompo-
nent thereof -arevariables that are subject to direct daily control of the central bank
and which the bank can employ to implement monetary policy. The instruments chosen
and the rules by which the instruments are adjusted define the day-to-day implementa-
tion of monetary policy. Most central banks employ a short-term interest rate as their
instrument. Some empirical evidence and practical experience indicate that the choice of
instruments is not so important.3
The design of monetary policy involves selecting goals, intermediate targets, indicators
and instruments. Let me start by discussing the goal of monetary policy. Price stability
and full employment are often mentioned as possible goals of monetary policy. Research
in recent years and practical experience during the postwar period have shown that an
explicit monetary policy goal of full employment leads to a high rate of inflation, while
an explicit price-stability goal alone does not result in lower rates of employment or
growth.4 In the medium and long term there is evidence that monetary policy can only
systematically affect nominal variables and not real ones. Therefore monetary policy
can only have nominal variables as useful goals. Price stability will provide the best
environment for efficient resource allocation and optimal growth. More and more countries
have also assigned priority to the goal of price stability. Price stability can also be seen
as the goal of the previous fixed exchange rate regimes in Europe, since one purpose of
the fixed exchange rate was to ultimately force domestic inflation to conform with the
low and stable German inflation. The discussion that follows is based on the assumption
that price stability is the goal of monetary policy.
For several reasons it seems important to make the price-stability goal specific and
3See Bernanke and Mishkin (1992).
4See for instance Alesina and Summers (1993).
3precise. A precisely defined goal may reduce the uncertainty about monetary policy that
a forced switch to a flexible exchange rate in all likelihood has caused. A precisely defined
goal means a stronger commitment to monetary policy and can increase its credibility. A
precisely defined goal makes it possible to monitor how well the goal is being met and to
criticize the central bank directly, even holding it responsible, in the event thegoal is not
met. A precisely defined goal can also help to stabilize inflation expectations.
Against this background, it seems suitable to define price stability as an interval for the
future price level or its rate of change, where the price level in turn is definedby the most
commonly known price index, the consumer price index. Several countries haverecently
specified explicit inflation targets, for instance Britain, Finland and Sweden,following
earlier examples of Canada and New Zealand. (See Freedman (1993) fora discussion of
the Canadian experience of inflation targets, and for references to the relevantliterature.)
Both theory and practical experiences indicate that institutional reformcan enhance
the credibility of the price-stability goals by: establishingprice stability as the goal of
monetary policy; by giving the central bank the independence that will enable it to achieve
the goal and resist short-term pressures and special interestgroups; and by holding the
Board of Governors and management of the central bank accountable if thegoal is not
met.
Although there is evidence that monetary policy in the medium and long termcan sys-
tematically affect only nominal variables, there is certainly evidence thatmonetary policy
has effects on real variables, output and employment, in the shortrun. Therefore, mone-
tary policy may stabilize or destabilize short-run fluctuations inoutput and employment,
although it cannot systematically affect average output and employment in the medium
and long run. This fact is not an argument againstprice stability as a goal for monetary
policy. On the contrary, a credible price-stability goal is likely to makemonetary policy
more effective in stabilizing short-run output fluctuations, for tworeason.
First, a price-stability policy implies an automatic stabilization ofaggregate demand
shocks. An increase in aggregate demand that leadsto increased inflation will be met
with a monetary contraction; viceversa for a decrease in aggregate demand. Second, it is
likely that long-run credibility for a price-stability policygives central bank more discre-
tion to stabilize output in the shortrun, as discussed in Bernanke and Mishkin (l992).
Without such long-run credibility a short-runmonetary expansion may be interpreted by
the private sector as the beginning ofan extended period of monetary expansion. There-
5See also Hörngren and Lindberg(1993).
4fore it may result in increased inflation expectations and increased wages, prices and
long-term interest rates. This may both dampen the initial stimulating effect on output
and lock the economy into a situation with high inflation. With long-run credibility, a
short-run monetary expansion rate will not lead to increased inflation expectations and
their accompanying negative effects.
As examples of this, Germany and the United States seem to have established good
long-mn credibility for a price-stability policy, with low long interest rates and low long-
run inflation expectations. This should imply considerable discretion in the short-run.
Consistent with this, the United States has been able to meet the latest recession with a
very expansionary monetary policy with very low short-term real interest, rates, without
any rise in long-run inflation expectations and long-term interest rates. Britain and Swe-
den, in contrast, seem to have lower long-run credibility for their price-stability policy,
which shows up in higher long-term interest rates and higher long-run inflation expec-
tations. Monetary expansion after the pound and the krona were floated indeed seem
to have resulted in increased inflation expectations, as will be further discussed below in
section 7. The scope for short-run monetary policy to stabilize output without endanger-
ing price stability seems smaller in Britain and Sweden than in German and the United
States.
After this discussion of the goal of monetary policy, let me go on to discuss interme-
diate targets. Since the central bank has only indirect control over the price level, and
since the latter reacts with "long and variable lags" to monetary policy measures, it may
be desirable to select an intermediate target. An ideal intermediate target has a high
correlation with the goal but is much easier to control and monitor. Thus, monetary
policy is made easier if it is focused on the intermediate target. It is easy to monitor how
well the central bank meets the intermediate target and the bank can more readily be
held accountable if the intermediate target is not met. But the problem, not surprisingly,
is that it is difficult to find an ideal intermediate target.
A fixed exchange rate towards a currency with a low and stable inflation can be seen
as an intermediate target to achieve price stability. However, fixed exchange rates do not
seem a realistic possibility in Europe in the short or medium term, except for Austria
and the Netherlands. Even if fixed exchange rates against a stable currency were feasible,
they may be a rather inefficient means to price stability, as argued in Svensson (1994).
Various money supply aggregates (from the monetary base to M3) are common as
intermediate targets. In the academic literature, such broader aggregates as nominal
5expenditure and nominal GDP have also been proposed as intermediate targets.6 Here,
however, there is a conflict; although more narrow money-supply aggregates are easier
to control, they may be very weakly correlated with the goal, while broader aggregates
correlate more closely with the goal but are more difficult to control. A special problem is
the fact that money supply aggregates have in many cases exhibited great instability-in
connection with financial innovations or changes in credit market regulations, for example.
Many observers have considered Germany's use of M3 as an intermediate target a
model for other countries.7 A target for the annual change in M3 is calculated based
on forecasts of the annual change in velocity and potential GNP, and on an explicit
inflation goal. However, this procedure requires stable empirical estimates of demand for
money and experience in forecasting the velocity. In the short term it may be difficult to
judge whether velocities are sufficiently forecastable for monetary aggregates to serve as
intermediate targets.8 One particular problem is that the change from a fixed exchange
rate to a flexible rate may itself affect the demand for money, in which case estimates with
data from the period with a fixed exchange rate will no longer be applicable. At least in
the short term after the abandonment of the fixed exchange rates, it seems most likely
that monetary aggregates will be important indicators but not intermediatetargets.
This implies a very important role for indicators. Without an intermediate target, only
indicators remain between the instrument and the goal. The central bank will then have
to use available indicators to assess the state of the economy and the stance of monetary
policy in order to decide whether the instrument need to be adjusted or not for achieving
price stability.
The central bank will need indicators of inflationpressure, especially indicators that
forecast inflation one to two years ahead, since this is probably about thelag between
the price level and monetary policy measures. A number of indicators willobviously be
necessary for this, including money and credit aggregates, output gaps, vacancies and
unemployment, asset prices and a number of other indicators used in forecasting business
cycles.
Indicators of inflation expectations will be of great interest rates, for at least tworear
'See Friedman (1990), McCallum(1990)and Rogoff (1985).
TSee Bernazike and Mishkin (1992).
'Itis worth noting that Germany's financial mazket is less developed thanmany other countries
and that Gennany lacks alternatives to bank deposits for interest-basedsavingsbyhouseholds and small
companies. This contributes to the relatively stability o(the demand for money, which can be expected to
exceed that inmany othercountrieswhereprivate bonds, National Debt Office accounts, money-market
fundsandother instruments have already been introduced.
6sons. Market expectations of inflation can be seen as the market's forecast of inflation,
which should have information for the central bank's forecast of inflation. Market ex-
pectations of inflation in relation to announced inflation goals also indicate the degree
of credibility of the goal. Indicators of monetary policy expectations, for instance mar-
ket expectations of future overnight interest rates when the overnight rate is the policy
instrument, should also be of obvious interest to the central bank.
Short and long term interest rates, in general the yield curve and its slope, are tra-
ditional indicators for monetary policy. in the rest of this paper I shall argue that the
information in the yield curve is more conveniently presented by the corresponding for-
ward rate curve, and I shall discuss how the forward rate curve can be used as an indicator
of market expectations of future interest rates, inflation rates and currency depreciation
rates.
3. Yields to Maturity, Spot Rates and Forward Rates
The standard yield curve displays bill and bond yields to maturity as a function of the
time to maturity. As is well known, the bond yield depends on the coupon size, the
"coupon effect." Yields for different coupons are therefore not comparable. To make
yield curves comparable they need to be standardized. This can be done in several ways.
The theoretically preferable way is to express the yield curve in terms of yields to maturity
on zero-coupon bond yields, spot (interest) rates. For maturities below 12 months spot
rates are directly available in the form of rates on Treasury bills which are zero-coupon
bonds. For longer maturities zero-coupon bonds are usually not available for sufficiently
many maturities and in sufficiently large issues to be sufficiently liquid. Therefore spot
rates will have to be estimated from yields on coupon bonds. Also, even if there were quite
a few longer-maturity zero-coupon bonds, one might still want to use the information in
the coupon bond yields. See Appendix 1 for details on how spot rates can be estimated
from data on coupon bonds.
A few markets for forward loans and investment exist for settlements within 1 year,
whereas very few or no such markets exist for longer maturities. Therefore, in practice
only implied forward interest rates are available. Implied forward interest rates are derived
from spot rates, since a forward investment with specific settlement and maturity dates
can be reproduced by a sale and a purchase of zero-coupon bonds: a sale of a bond
maturing on the forward contract's settlement date and a purchase of bonds of the same
market value that matures on the forward contract's maturity date. The implied forward
7rate is thereturnon such a readjustment of a bond portfolio.
The algebra of spot and forward rates is easiest if all rates are continuouslycompounded.9
Let i(t, 2') be the continuously compounded spot rate for a zerocoupon bond traded at
time t, the trade date, that matures at time T> 1, the maturity date. Letf(t, t', T) be
the (implied) forward rate on a forward contract concluded at timet, the trade date, for
an investment that starts at time 9 > t, the settlement date, and ends at time T >9,




That is, the forward rate for a one-year investment with settlement in 4years (9 —t=4
years) and maturity in 5 years (T —= 5years) ("the 1-year forward rate 4 years from
now") is equal to 5 times the 5-year spot rate minus 4 times the 4-yearspot rate.
The instantaneous (-maturity) spot rate (in practice theover-night rate) is defined as
i(t)limi(i,T) (3.2)
and the instantaneous(-maturity) forward rate is definedas
f(t,i'))Jmf(t,i',T). (3.3)
The finite-maturity forward rate f(t, 9, T), T> 9, will be the average integral of the
instantaneous forward rates with settlement between t' andT,
f(t, 9, T) =f..f(t,r)dr
(3.4)
Instantaneous forward rates and finite-maturityspot rates are related as marginal
and average cost of production, when the timeto maturity is identified with quantity
produced. The spot rate i(t, T) at time t withmaturity at time 2' is identical to the
average of the instantaneous forward rates with settlements between the trade date t and
the maturity date 2',
1(2,2')fT=f(t,:)dr
(3.5)
9The continuously compoundedspot rate i(tT)andthe annually compounded spot rate (t,T) are related by i(t.T) =exp[IQ,T)}_1and iQ,T)= ln[1+i(t,T)].
8Equivalently, theforwardand spot rates fulfill the relation,
f(t, T)i(t, T) + (T —1)th(tT) (3.6)
which is the standard relation between marginal and average cost, with time to maturity
T —tcorresponding to quantity produced. Hence, when looking at spot and forward rates
we shall recognize sometimes the familiar shapes known from textbooks of microeconomic
theory.
Figure Ia shows actual market bond yields and estimated spot and forward rates
for France, for the trade date September 22, 1993. The squares show quotes of the
overnight rate, Treasury bill yields and government bond yields, annually compounded
and expressed in percent per year, and plotted against the maturity date.1° The dashed
curve shows estimated spot rates plotted against the maturity date. The solid curve shows
estimated instantaneous forward rates plotted against settlement (and maturity, since the
two coincide for instantaneous forward rates). The forward rates approach a constant
value for long maturities, marked by a horizontal line with long dashes. Error bars on the
spot and forward rate curves denote 95 percent confidence intervals. See Appendix 1 for
details on the estimation.
We see that the French spot curve on September 22, 1993, had a U-shape somewhat
similar to the standard shape of average cost curves in microeconomics. Consequently
the forward rate curve has a shape somewhat similar to the standard shape of marginal
cost curves. The spot and forward rate curves start for zero time to maturity in the
same point, the forward rate curve lies below the spot rate curve while the spot rate is
decreasing in the time to maturity, the forward rate curve cuts the spot rate curve at the
latter's minimum, and the forward rate curve lies above the spot curve when the latter is
increasing. When for long times to maturity the forward rate becomes constant, the spot
rate asymptotically approaches the same constant.
Since spot rates and forward rates can be derived from each other, they contain the
same information. Using forward rates instead of spot rates is hence just presenting
the same information in a different way. Using forward rates is an advantage when the
emphasis is on expected future time paths of relevant variables rather than expected future
time averages àf these variables.
Next I shall discuss how forward rates can help to infer market expectations about
'°The rates in the graphs are annually compounded, since that is the standard Waytoexpress interest
rates, even though the equations and computations are easiest with continuously compounded rates.
9future interest rates, inflation rates and future currency depredation rates.
4. Expected Future Interest Rates
Under subjective certainty (perfect foresight, or point expectations) theforwardrate
f(t, t',T)for a givensettlement date Cand maturity dateTwill equal the expected
future spot rate i(t', T) with tradedateequal to the forward contract's settlement date
and maturity date the same as the forward contract. Thus, the instantaneous forward
rate will equal the expected future instantaneous spot rate (the future overnightrate).
Why is this? The reason is that a forward contract that involves lending at a future
date, the settlement date, can be financed at the settlement date by borrowingon the spot
market at the settlement date. Then the difference between the predetermined forward
rate and the spot rate determined on the settlement date, f(i, C, T) —i(t',T), is the excess
(nominal) return on the forward contract. Under subjective certainty thatexcess return
mustbe zero.
Under subjectiveuncertainty,the excess return on the forwardcontractis uncertain at
thetradedate,since thefuture spot rateisuncertain. Whether the forward rate equals
theexpected future spot rate then simply boilsdownto whether the expected excess
return on the forwardcontractis zero or not. The expected excess return on the forward
contract is theforwardterm premium, (t,C,T). Hence, the expected future spot rate is
the forward rate less the forward term premium, -
Ei(1',T) 1(4 t',T)
—p(t,t', T). (4.1)
Hence, whether the forward rate indicates the expected futurespot rate is simply a matter
of the size and the sign of the forward termpremium.
Older theories of the term premium include theliquidity preference theory, which
implies a positive holding period term premium (seebelow), and the preferred habitat
theory, according to which the term premium for different settlementsdepend on relative
supply and demand from investors with different horizons. Morerecent asset pricing
theory (see Shiller (1990) and Svensson (1993b)) explains eachpremium as depending
upon the covariance of the relevant real excess return with the real returnon the market
portfolio (CAPM), real consumption (consumption-basedCAPM), or the marginal rate
of real consumption (general assetpricing model). From the more recent theories there
seems to be no prior as to the sign and magnitude of theterm premium.
10The discussion of term premia in the literature is complicated by the fact that there are
actually three different (but related) term premia that need to be distinguished (Shiller
(1990)).Asidefrom the forward term premium there is the holding period term premium
(the expected excess return of holding a long bond a short period over the short interest
rate) and the rollover termpremia (the expected excess return of holding along bond to its
maturity over the return from rolling over a short bond to the long bond's maturity) (see
Appendix 2 for precise definitions). The literature has mostly discussed holding period
term premia for, say, 10-year bonds held for 1 year. This premium is 9 times the forward
term premium with settlement in 1 year and maturity in 10 years. This is a combination
of settlement and maturity that is hardly relevant for monetary policy; the forward term
premia that are relevant would rather have settlement in 2-4 years, say, and maturity one
year after. There are very few estimates in the literature of forward term premia with
that combination of settlement and maturity."
McCulloch (1975, Table 6) reports average (unconditional) forward term premia for US
monthly Treasury bills and Treasury bonds data for the period 1946-1966. For settlement
in 1-5 years and maturity 1 year later he finds positive but small prernia, 0.03-0.10 percent
per year, not significantly different from zero. For settlement in 10 years and maturity 1
year later the premium is -1.09 percent per year, not significantly different from zero.
For the period 1952-1987 I have estimated unconditional forward term premia on a
database presented in McCulloch (1990), for settlement in 1-4 years and maturity 1 year
later.'2 The result is displayed in Table I. The premia are fairly small and negative, be-
tween -0.10 and -0.62 percent per year, not significantly different from zero (the premium
for settlement in 4 years is close to being significant, though).'3
Conventional wisdom says that yield curves often have a positive slope (that is, the
yield spread between long and short rates is positive). This is sometimes taken as implying
positive term premia. That implication is not correct, though. Term prernia can be small
or even zero even if the yield spread is positive: Suppose short rates are increasing over
the sample period (this is the case for samples ending with the 1980s). Suppose term
ttcampbell and SMiler (1991) test and reject the expectations hypobtesis for a number of different
combinations of different maturities and settlement. They do not report estimates of term premia,
though. Frachot and Lease (1993) derive term premia in a model of the term structure with stochastic
conditional volatility and are able to explain the empirical results of Campbell and Shifler (1991).
"This is the seine dataset that Campbell and Shifler (1991) uses.
'3For VS data, for settlement in 2-4 years and maturity 1 year later, Fame and Bliss (1987) cannot
reject the hypothesis that forward rates forecast future interest rates and that forward term premia are
zero.
11premia are zero, so tong rates equal expected average short ratesup to the long bond
maturity. If short rates are expected to increase, expected future short rates and hence
current long rates are of course higher than current short rates.
To check this, I have estimated the average yield spread between 1-10yearmaturities
and the 3-month maturity, on McCulloch's (1990)dataset.The result is reported in
Table 2. The average yield spread is positive, between 0.37 and 0.81percent per year,
and significantly different from zero. This is so even thoughterm premia are small and
negative.
The premia reported here are average, unconditional, termpremia. It is, however, the
conditional time-varying preinia that are relevant in (4.1). Even ifunconditional term
premia are small, it is possible that time-varying term premiacan be sometimes large. If
time-varying premia are forecastable and economically significant, forwardrates should
be adjusted by the premia in order to inferexpected future interest rates. Then the
time-varying premia should be estimated simultaneously with thespot and forward rates.
If time-varying term premia are not forecastable, theforward rates should be adjusted
with the unconditional term premia. The estimates ofthese reported here indicate that
they are rather small, though. However, even if the termpremia were large, if they were
relatively stable, shifts over time in unadjusted forward ratecurves would still contain
information, even if the level of the curves would be less reliable.
In the rest of the paper I shall assume that theterm premia relevant for monetary
policy are negligible, and that forward rates indicateexpected future spot rates.
Treasury bill and government bond yields fluctuatequite a bit from day to day, per-
haps depending upon temporary excess demandor supply for different maturities. Con-
sequently estimates of spot and forward rates fluctuatequite a bit from day to day. I do
not want to assume that these short-mn fluctuationsnecessarily reflect short-run changes
in expected future spot rates. Instead theassumption is that forward rates indicate ex-
pected future spot rates when these short-run fluctuationsare filtered out. Therefore,
throughout one should use for instancemoving averages over one or a few weeks, rather
than estimates for a particular day. Forconvenience only, the examples in this paper will
refer to estimates for single dates.
Figure lb shows spot rates (dashed curves) and forwardrates (solid curves) on Septem-
ber 22, 1993, for France (thickcurves) and Britain (thin curves). Consider expectations
of future monetary policy forFrance, as manifested by the overnight rate. We see that
the expected overnight rate isexpected to be lowered to almost 5 percentper year at the
12end of 1995. From 1996 onwards the over-night rate is expected to increase to about 7
percent per year by year 2001. For Britain, the overnight rates are expected to increase
from a bit more than 5 percent per year to reach 8 percent per year in year 2000.
How should such expected increases in the overnight rate be interpreted? Could they
be interpreted as an expected future monetary contraction because of expected future
inflation? Hardly. If the central bank is expected to react to higher inflation with a
monetary contraction this would be incorporated into price-setting behavior, in which case
the higher inflation and resulting contraction would not occur, and hence not be expected
to occur. An expected increase in overnight rates might reflect a return to normal short
real rates if these are currently abnormally low. Current French and British short real
rates do not seem to be abnormally low, though.'4 Instead it seems that the expected
increase in overnight interest rates must be interpreted as an expected accommodation
of the central bank to a situation of higher inflation, higher money growth, and higher
interest rates due to Iowa demand for real money balances. Inflation expectations will
be further discussed in the next section.
Whereas the forward rates indicate the expected time-path of future short interest
rates, the spot rate for a particular maturity indicates the expected average short rates
up to that maturity. The British spot rate of 7 percent per year for maturity in year 2000
is hence the average short rate between 1993 and 2000.
What about expected future interest rate differentials across countries? From (4.1)
and its foreign analog we get that the expected future interest rate differential between
the domestic and foreign country fulfills
Ei(t', T) —Ei(t',T)f(t, t', T) —f(t,C, T) —[y(i,C, T) —rp(t,C, T), (4.2)
where foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk. The expected future interest rate
differential equals the difference between the domestic and foreign forward rates less the
difference between the domestic and foreign forward term premia. If the premia are of
the same sign and magnitude they will hence cancel.
Assuming that the premia are either negligible or that they cancel, we can use the
difference between the French and British forward rate curves in Figure lb to infer the
Bank of England (1993a)displaysa real forward rate curve (derived from the British index-linked
gifts) that does not indicate an expected rapid increase in short real interest rates. In May 1993 the real
forward rate for settlement in 2 years was 3 percent per year. It increases slowly with settlement and
reaches 4 percent per year for settlement in about 14 years.
13expected future interest rate differential between the two countries. The differential is
obviously expected to go from almost minus 2 percentage points to plus 2 percentage
points in about 4 years.
5. Expected Future Inflation Rates
Let r(t,T)and ir(i, T) denote the real spot interest rate and the inflation rate, respectively,
between times i and T, T > i.15 Under subjective certainty the Fisher equation holds.
That is, the future inflation rate ir(t', T) between time C and T that is expected at time
i, t c C c T, is equal to the difference between the expected future nominal and real spot
rates between times I' and T, 1(2', T) —r(i',T). Under subjective certainty the nominal
forward rate equals the expected nominal future spot rate. Furthermore, if there is market
for real bonds, the real forward rate equals the expected real future spot rate. Hence, the
expected future inflation rate equals the difference between the nominal and real forward
rates.
With subjective uncertainty, the expected future inflation rate is no longer necessarily
equal to the difference between expected future nominal and real spot rate. Instead an
inflation risk premium O(t, 2', T) enters, so we have
Egr(t', T)Ei(t', T) —Etr(t', T)
—0(1,L', T). (5.1)
The inflation risk premium is the expected real excess return on nominal bondsover real
bonds. According to standard theory it depends on the covariance between thatexcess
return and the return on the market portfolio (CAPM), consumption (consumption-based
CAPM) or the marginal rate of substitution (general asset-pricing model) (see Svensson
(199Th)). Furthermore, we have seen in (4.1) that the expected nominal futurespot rate
equals the nominal forward rate less the (nominal) term premium. Hence, the expected
future inflation rate is related to the forward rate as
En(t, i',T)f(i,t',T) —E1r(t', T)
—w(t, t', T)—0(2,i', T). (5.2)
With a market for real bonds, as in Britain, the expected future realspot rate is related
"The inflation rate rQ,T) isdefinedas r(1,T) =JnIP(!?(I)1, whereP(i) istheprice level at timeS.
14to the real forward rate, g(t, t', T), via the real (forward) term premium, '(t, jlT),
Egr(t',T)g(t,t',T) —'(i,t',T). (5.3)
It follows that the expected future inflation rate can be written
Egir(t, 9, T)f(t, 9, T) —g(i,9, T) —[y(t,9, T) —'(t,11, T)] —O(t,I', T), (5.4)
the difference between the nominal and real forward rates, less thedifferencebetween the
nominal and real term premia, lessthe inflationrisk premium.
If there is a market for real bonds, expression (5.4) can be used. If the nominal and
real term premia are of the same sign and magnitude they will cancel. The inflation risk
premium should be small in an economy with real bonds, since with real bonds in the
market portfolio the correlation between inflation and the return on the market portfolio
should be less. Then expression (5.4) should be a rather reliable measure of expected
future inflation rates.'6
Without a market for real bonds, only expression (5.2) can be used. The estimated
expected future inflation rate will be contingent upon an assumed expected future real
interest rate.
As mentioned the inflation risk premium depends on the covariance between the excess
real return on nominal bonds over real bonds and the return on the market portfolio,
consumption or the marginal rate of substitution, depending upon which asset pricing
model is used. The excess return is simply the negative of the rate of inflation. The
inflation risk premium then depends on the covariance between inflation and the variables
mentioned. Whether the inflation premium is positive or negative depends (in CAPM)
on whether inflation is negatively or positively correlated with the return on the market
portfolio. A priori it is not obvious which sign the inflation risk premium will have.
Regardless of the sign, the correlation between inflation and the return on the market
portfolio is probably not large, in which case the inflation risk premium is unlikely to be
large.
In the rest of the paper I shall assume that the inflation risk premium is negligible.
Assume that the expected future real spot rate for France and Britain will be between
'6Bank of England (1993a,b) reports inflation expectations for Britain by subracting a real implied
forward rate curve from a nominal forward rate curve. The real fbrward rate curve is estimated from
yields on the British index-linked gUts. Woodward (1990) has previously used data on the index-linked
guts to compute the term structure of inflation expectations for Britain.
153 and 4 percent from 1996 onwards.'7 Then in Figure lb we conclude that the expected
French inflation rate for 1996 is 1.5-2.5 percent per year, since the forward rate for that
year is about 5.5 percent per year. The expected inflation rate rises somewhat to 3-4
percent per year around year 2001. The expected future British inflation rate is 3.5-4.5
percent per year in 1996 and increases further to 4-5 percent per year around year 2001.
The difference between the nominal spot rate for given maturity and an assumed real spot
rate would indicate the expected average inflation rate for that maturity. The difference
between the nominal forward rate for a given settlement and an assumed future real rate
indicate the expected future inflation rate at the time of the settlement. Hence, the
forward rate curve indicate the expected time-path of the inflation rate, whereas the spot
rate curve indicates the expected average future inflation.
What about expected future inflation differentials across countries. From (5.2) and
its foreign analog follows
Etff(2,t',T) —E1r(t,2', T) 1(2, 2', T) —f(t,2', T) —[Etr(2', T)
—E1r(t',T)]
—[w(2,t', T)—y(t, il,T)J —[0(2,2', T) —0(1,t', T)].
(5.5)
The expected inflation rate differential is equal to the difference between the forward
rates, less the difference between the expected real rates, less the difference between the
term premia, less the difference between the inflation risk premia. If expected future real
rates, term premia and inflation risk premia are similar across the countries, the forward
rate difference is a good indicator of the expected future inflation differentials.
In Figure ib, for 1996 and a few years after, the expected inflation for Britain is about
2 percentage points higher than for France.
6. Expected Future Currency Depreciation Rates
Under subjective certainty the expected future depredation rate between time 2'andtime
T >2'of the domestic currency relative to the foreigncurrency, 8(2', T), must equal the
'TThis is consistent with the realforward rate curve presented in Bank ofEngland(1993a). Note thattt does not make sense to assume a given expected real except at Least a couple ofyears into the
future.In the shortrun there is considerable inertia in the price level and the inflation rate. With some
aamphflcation: in the short run the inflation is sticky and the real rate adjusts to the nominalrate;the
mediumandlongrimthe real rate is sticky and the nominal rate adjusts to the expected inflation rate.
16expected future interest rate differential, i(i', T) —i(t',T).18 Under subjective ceitainty
the forward foreign exchange risk premium, eQ,V,T), enters into the relation,
Efi(i',T)Ei(t',T) —Ei(t',T)
—C(i,t',T), (6.1)
so the expected future currency depreciation rate equals the expected future interest rate
less the forward foreign exchange risk premium.
The forward foreign exchange risk premium is the expected excess nominal return on
domestic currency bonds over foreign currency bonds. It depends on the covariance with
the nominal return on the market portfolio (CAPM) or the nominal mirginal rate of
substitution (general asset-pricing model) (see Svensson 1993c)).
Uncovered interest parity is the same thing as zero foreign exchange risk premia.
Uncovered interest rate parity is usually empirically rejected, except for the franc/mark
exchange rate (see Rose and Svensson (1993), for instance). However, attempts to estimate
the size of foreign exchange risk premia have usually resulted in very small premia (see
Hodrick (1987) and Marston (1993) for surveys).
In the rest of the paper I shall assume that the foreign exchange risk premium is
negligible.
From (4.2) follows that the expected currency depreciation rate fulfills
E6(i', T) =f(i,t', T) —f(t,1', T) —(p(t,jI,T)—wit, 1',T)J —(t,i', T), (6.2)
the difference between the forward rates, less the difference between the term premia, less
the foreign exchange risk premium.
If the term premia are assumed to cancel, and the foreign exchange risk premium is
assumed to be negligible, the vertical distance between the French and British forward
rate curves show the expected future depreciation rate of the franc relative to the pound.
The vertical distance between the French and British spot curves shows the average rate
of depreciation up to the maturity date.
Figure Ic shows the expected future depredation rate (dashed curve) and expected
"Let eQ) denote the log exchange rate (log of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency).
Then the domesticcurrency depreciationrate 6(t, 7') i defined as
L(t,T)5
17future accumulatedlog depredation(solid curve) of the francrelativeto the pound.'9
Hence the dashed curveistheslopeof the solidcurve.We see that the franc is expected
todepredate initially butappreciateeventually bymorethan 10 percent in thenext10
years.
7. Comparison of Monetary Policies
This section compares monetary policies in France, Germany, Britain, Sweden and the
United States with the help of graphs of spot and forward rates as weU as of expected
future exchange rates. Figures 2a, Ii and 3a, 6 show spot and forward rates bycountry
and by trade date. The six trade dates are September 14 and 21 for 1992 (before and
after Black Wednesday, September 16, 1992); February 5, May 7, August .2 (immediately
after the July crisis 1993) and September 22 for 1993. The first five dates are chosen to
coincide with those for which Bank of England's model Inflation Reportreport British
forward rates (Bank of England (1993cr, 6)). The British forward rates estimated here
correspond closely to those reported by Bank of England, although they are computed
with different methods.2°
Spot and forward rates have been estimated with the help of selected Treasury bill
and government bond yields for each trade date, with a method described inAppendix 1.
The estimates should really be done with all the reasonably liquid bills andbonds, and
with a fair amount of detailed institutional knowledge of eachcountry's bill and bond
market. A few different estimation methods should also be tried. Thegraphs presented
here should therefore be considered as indicative only.
Graphs of forward rates lend themselves very well to studies of particular events,
and the graphs should really be interpreted by researchers with detailedknowledge of
monetary policy events in each country. Lacking such knowledge for countries other than
Sweden, I will here only present some broad impressions, and instead invite specialistson
'Theexpected accumulated logdepreciation is givenby
= Egt(t,T)(T—t), T> t.
Under the assumption of anegligible foreignexchange risk premium (uncovered interest parity) it fulfills
Eie(T)—e(t) =(i(t,T)—i' (1, T))(T—t).
20Bank of England computes forward rates froma par yieldcurve, the estimationof which is described
in Bank of England (1990) and Mastronikola (1991).
18each country for more detailed interpretation.
Consider Figure Sa which shows instantaneous forward rates by country. Central banks
control interest rates at the shortest maturities (overnight or weekly rates, say). Central
banks therefore control the left end-point of each forward rate curve (the shortest forward
rate coincides with the shortest spot rate). The rest of the curves is determined by the
market, and can be interpreted as the market's expectations of future short rates, hence
of future monetary policy as it is manifested in the short rates central banks set. The
excess of the forward rates over a given expected future real spot rate can be interpreted
as the expected future inflation, and differences between countries' forward rates can
be interpreted as expected future currency depreciation rates1 all under the maintained
assumption that the relevant prernia are either negligible or cancel. Even if the premia axe
not negligible or do not cancel, as long as they are stable over time, shifts in the curves
convey information even if levels cannot be interpreted.
However, let me repeat that I do not want to assume that day-to-day fluctuations
in estimated forward rates should be interpreted in this way, instead the interpretation
concerns averages over one or a few weeks, say. The estimated spot and forward rates to
be discussed are nevertheless for simplicity from six single dates only, which is another
reason why only broad impressions rather than a detailed interpretation is presented.
Figure 3a shows that forward rate curves in general have shifted down during the last
year. For the United States longer forward rates have fallen more than shorter, whereas
the opposite is the case for the other countries. The British experience is interesting (it
is also discussed in Bank of England's Inflation Report). The lowering of short rates after
Black Wednesday was followed by a considerable increase (several percentage points) in
long forward rates. Only recently have long forward rates come down to where they were
immediately before Black Wednesday. One interpretation is that monetary expansion
after Black Wednesday, with limited credibility due to Britain's inflation history and lack
of independence of Bank of England, led to a considerable increase in long run inflation
expectations. For France lower short rates have not been followed by increases in the
long forward rates. Only recently have the long forward rates come down somewhat. For
Sweden the lowering of short rates have, as for Britain, been followed by increases in long
forward rates, and only during the last summer have they come down to where they were
immediately before Black Wednesday.
A comparison with Figure Ea for Britain and Sweden shows that the spot rates give
a different interpretation than the forward rates. The long spot rates had come down
19below the levels of September 14, 1992, already in February, 1993, and they have fallen
considerably below since. The long spot rates, being the average forward rates from the
trade date up to the maturity, are influenced also by expected interest rate movements
in the near term, whereas long forward rate have filtered out the effects of short-term
expectations. To the extent that the focus is on expected interest and inflation rates in
years a few years into the future, the forward rates are more relevant than the spot rates.
Indeed, since monetary policy has effects on the price level with a lag of, say, one or two
years, in monetary policy issues it should be frequent to look beyond the first year or two.
Looking at the spot rates in such a situation may actually be misleading, as this example
shows.
Figure Sbshowsforward rates by trade dates. Especially in the spring of 1993 the
countries fall into two categories. France, Germany, and the United States fall in one
category, with similar relatively low long forward rates. Britain and Sweden fall into
another category, with significantly higher long forward rates. This pattern is less clear
in the fall of 1993, with the long forward rates of France and Britain falling in between
those of Sweden and the United States.
I interpret this as indicating that there is higher credibility for price-stability monetary
policy in France, Germany, and the United States than in Britain and Sweden.2' In
Britain and Sweden the lowering of short rates have lead to increased long forward rates,
which only recently have come back to the same levels as before Black Wednesday. The
United States's high credibility has allowed a very expansionary monetary policy in the
short run with very low short nominal and real rates, without resulting in increased long
forward rates due to increased long-run inflation expectations. Instead the long forward
rates have even come down during the last year. Germany's long forward rates have also
come down since September 1992. Whereas France in the spring of 1993 had forward
rates very similar to Germany's, after the July crisis the long forward rates have risen
somewhat above Germany's, which if sustained might be interpreted as indicatingsome
market doubts about France's long-run inflation outlook.
Figure 4a shows expected future mark exchange rates for the franc, the pound, the
krona and the dollar, expressed as accumulated log depreciation fromSeptember 14, 1992.
The left end-point of each curve shows the spot exchange rateon the corresponding trade
date. The rest of each curve shows the expected accumulated futurelog depreciation
(1993).
reasonsfor the high crethbilityofprice stability in the United States are discussed by Goodiriend
20calculated from the differences between forward rates in Figure 3b. Therefore Figure
4a simply shows the exchange rate expectations that are consistent with the forward
interest rates and the spot exchange rate on each trade date. The franc had in September
1993 depreciated a few percent relative to the mark, but there were no expectations of
further depredation. The pound had in September 1993 depreciated quite a bit, some
appreciation was expected in the short term, and in the long run further depreciation is
expected. For the krona, it appears that during the September 1992 crises, the expected
devaluation was about 10 percent (see the kink at 10 percent for the curves of September
14 and 21 in 1992). After the krona was floated in November 1992 it has depreciated
rapidly, more rapidly than expected, and in September 1993 further depreciation was
expected. The dollar has fluctuated relative to the mark quite a bit, but there are no
expectations of substantial future depreciation or appreciation.
8. Conclusion
In the new situation with flexible exchange rates, monetary policy in Europe will have
to rely more on indicators than previously under fixed rates, especially since it will most
likely be difficult, at least for some time, to find appropriate and reliable intermediate
targets for monetary policy. Several different indicators will have to be used. One of the
potential indicators, the (implied) forward interest rate curve, can be used to indicate
market expectations of the time-paths of future short interest rates, monetary policy,
inflation rates and currency depredation rates.
The forward rate curve contains the same information as the spot rate curve, but it
presents the information in a way that makes it easier to interpret for monetary policy pur-
poses. Thus the forward rate curve separates market expectations for the short, medium
and long term more easily than the spot rate curve. Since monetary policy measures
have effects with "long and variable lags," looking beyond the short term is important
in monetary policy. Using long spot rates or long bond yields instead of long forward
rates can then give misleading impressions, since long spot rates and long bond yields
include expectations of interest rate movements in the short term. In long forward rates
expectations of interest rate movements in the short term have been filtered out:
Monetary policy in France, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden and the United States
has been interpreted with the help of forward rates. The British and Swedish experience
is similar in that long forward rates increased considerably after the pound and the krona
were floated, and the long forward rates have come down to pre-September 1992 levels
21only recently. In contrast, monetary expansion and very low short-term interest rates
in the United States has been followed by a fall in long forward rates. There is some
indication of an increase in French long forward rates after the widening of ERM bands in
August 1993. These developments have been be interpreted in terms of movements in long
run inflation expectations. The developments and the interpretation in terms of inflation
expectations are consistent with the idea that long-run credibility for a price-stability
policy increases the scope for monetary policy to stabilize output and employment in the
short run.
The paper has highlighted the role of term, inflation and foreign exchange risk premia
in using forward rates as indicators of future interest rates, inflation rates and currency
depredation rates. The maintained assumption in the analysis of monetary policy in the
five countries considered is that the relevant premia either cancel or are negligible. This
maintained assumption has some empirical support. Estimates of average forward premia
for settlement in a few years and maturity one year later indicate that the premia are
small. Also, the conventional wisdom that upward sloping yield curves imply positive
term prernia is not correct, since the upward sloping yield curve may be explained by
expectations of rising short rates over the sample. However, it is actually conditional time-
varying premia, rather than unconditional average premia that are relevant. More research
on and estimation of unconditional time-varying forward premia with these combinations
of settlement and maturity is called for. The literature has usually considered other term
premia, the holding period and rollover term premia, and other combinations of settlement
and maturity. The literature has also frequently focused on testing the expectations
hypothesis (the hypothesis of zero risk premia) rather than on actually estimating the
size of the premia in order to judge whether the premia are economically as well as
statistically significant.
If unconditional time-varying premia are non-negligible, that does not mean that for-
ward rates cannot be used as indicators, only that the premia should be estimated simul-
taneously with the forward rates and then used to adjust the forward rates.
A. Estimation of Spot and Forward Interest Rates
The estimation of spot and forward rates follows McCulloch (1971, 1975) in fitting for
each trade date a discount function (the price of a zero-coupon bond as a function of the
time to maturity) to bill and bond price data, but it uses the functional form of Nelson
22and Siegel (1987) instead of McCulloch's cubic spline.22
Nelson and Siegel (1987) assume that the instantaneous forward rate is the solution
to a second-order differential equation with two equal roots. Hence it can be written
f(m; /9,r)=o+ p1exp(—) +fi2 exp (—2!), (A.1)
where m ￿ 0 is the time to maturity in years, and where Pa, th,/92 andr are the
parameters. The spot rate can be derived by integrating the forward rate according to
(3.5). It is given by
i(m;fl,r)=po+(flt+$)lex;( ;)
—$2exp(_). (A.2)
Let i(0;$,r), f(0;/I,r), i(oo;$,r) and f(co;fi,r) denote the limits of the spot and
forward rates when the time to maturity goes to zero and infinity, respectively. The spot
and forward rates have the properties
i(oo;fl,r) =f(oo;fl,r)=Poand (A.3)
i(O; /9,r)=1(0;/9,r)=Pc+ fly. (A.4)
Furthermore, suppose there is a maximum or a minimum for the forward rate, that is,
there is an fit￿0 such that the derivative fm(th; /9,r)=0,with I= f(th;/9,'r).Then,
!=th+thexP(_1) and (A.5)
(A.6)
It follows that the parameters Pa, fit,/92 andr can be computed recursively by f(oo),
1(0), Iandfit,whichfacilitates their interpretation and the choice of starting values in
the estimation procedure.
The discount function is then given by
d(rn; /9,r)=exp[—i(m;/9,i-)mJ. (A.?)
22See Dahlquist andSvensson(1993)fora comparision of estimates of spot and forward rates with
the simple functional form of Nelson and Siegel (1987)andthe complex functional form of Longstaff and
Schwartz (1992).
23For a given trade date, let there be it coupon bonds (ç,, rn,,p1),j = 1,...,n,where
c1,rn1 andp denote, respectively, the coupon, the time to maturity and the observed
price of bond j,whichis assumed to have a face value of 100 units of domestic currency.
If bond prices are not directly available, they are computed from the yields to maturity.
For given parameters (fi,r).the model prices of the bonds, P,(/3, r),axecomputed with
the discount function evaluating each coupon payment:
For annual coupon payments, let rik, k =1,2,...,K5, denote the times for the coupon
payments on bond j,whereK, is the number of coupon payments. In the special case
when rn5isan integer, we simply have tjk= kand K1 =rn;. Inthe general case we have
=rna—Lms]+k—1and
(AS) K5 =[rn5]+1
where [m1J denotes the largest integer that is strictly smaller than rn.Themodel price
of each bond, P;($,r), is the present value of the bond when the coupon payments and




Forsemiannual coupon payments, that is, for Britain and the United States, these
relations are accordingly modified.
The observed price is assumed to differ from the model price by an error term, cj,
=Pj($,r)+ c,. (A.1O)
The model prices are then fitted to the observed prices with non-linear least squares or
with maximum-likelihood. The estimates in this paper are maximum likelihood. The 95%
confidence intervals have been computed with the delta method and are heteroskedasticity-
consistent.
Figure Al corresponds to Figure la, for France, September 22, 1993. It shows actual
bond prices (squares), estimated bond prices with 95% confidence intervals (dots with
error bars), and coupons (pluses). For this estimation the root mean square error is 0.28
"That model prices will not be exactlyequal to observedprices would be a problem if the model was
used to price financial instruments, since that would allow arbitrage (cf. Hull (1993, p. 398)). However,
the purpose here is to provide spot and forward rates to be used as indicators for monetary policy, in
which case small deviations between model and observedpricesis of no significance.
24percent of the bonds's principal value. The maximum error is 0.68 percent of the face value
of the 19-year bond maturing in year 2012. The root mean square error of yield errors
is 0.13 percentage points. The parameters are fib =0.0746,fl= —00060,th= —0.0571
and r =2.210.For long maturities the spot and forward rates hence approach the level
7.46 percent per year continuously compounded, which corresponds to 7.75 percent per
year annually compounded.
The estimates of the spot and forward rates in this paper has been done with the
restriction that the estimated spot rate and forward rate for zero maturity and settlement
should equal the quoted overnight rate (in practice, that fib and fi'shouldsum to the
quoted overnight rate). In some cases that has lead to a poor fit of the Treasury bill rates
with maturity 3, 6 or 12 months. Then the zero-maturity spot and forward rate has been
adjusted to give a better fit to the Treasury bill rates. In these cases the left end-points of
the spot and forward rate curves of course differ from the quoted overnight rate. Figure
la is one such case. There the zero-maturity spot and forward rate has been set to is
7.1 percent per year annually compounded, which differ from the quoted overnight rate,
about 7.5 percent per year annually compounded. This procedure has been followed since
I have trusted the Treasury bill data more than the overnight rate data.
It is desirable that the estimated spot rates should fit the Treasury bill rates well since
the latter are actual spot rates. There is no reason the estimated spot rates should equal
the coupon bond yields, since the yields depend on the coupons. Therefore, the fact that
the spot rates in Figure la deviate from the bond yields for long maturities does not
indicate a bad fit.
Minimizing the squared deviations from Treasury bill and bond prices gives less weight
to short-maturity yields, since prices are insensitive to yields for short maturities. Unre-
stricted estimates can then give fairly large deviations for short yields. That is the reason
why I have imposed the restriction on estimated zero-maturity spot and forward rates.
Alternatively, the price deviations can be weighted somewhat in favor of short maturities.
Minimizing deviations from yields is of course an implicit strong weighting of short ma-
turities. In general, the weighting should be motivated by the purpose of the estimation,
especially in which maturity range most precision is desired.
Convergence was fast with reasonable starting values, especially when the parameters
fi'and$2 were scaled by 100.
See Dahlquist and Svensson (1993) for further discussion of these and related issues.
25B. Three Different Term Premia
As discussed in Shiller (1990) there are threekindsof term premia that have been discussed
in the literature. The forward term premium ç(t, 1', T) is defined as
p(t, 2', T)f(t, I',T)—Ei(t',T). (13.1)
The holding period term premium rph(t,1',T) is defined as
'P4@,t',T) E1h(t, 2', T) —1(2,9), (8.2)
where the holding period return h(t, 1', T) is the rate of return from holding a bond




The rollover term premium çt',(i,T,m) is defined as
ço,(t,T,m) =i(1,T)
— (2 + U—11)m,t+jrn), (13.4)
where m =and n is an integer, the number of times a bond of maturity m is rolled
over.
The following relations hold between these term premia:
(ph(t,9, T)w(tt',7')(T — 2')
(13.5)
w@,t', T)1y(t, t+ (j — 1)m,i+ im). (3.6)
26Table 1. Forward Term Premium (1-year rates, %/yr)
Settlement Premium Std Err
1 yr -0.10 0.22
2yrs -0.24 0.36
3 yrs -0.44 0.36
4 yrs -0.62 0.34
Table 2. Yield spread (over 3-month yields, %/yr)
Maturity Spread Std Err
1 yr 0.37 0.05
2 yrs 0.49 0.10
3 yrs 0.57 0.13
4 yrs 0.63 0.13
5 yrs 0.68 0.13
10 yrs 0.81 0.12
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0Figure 4b. Expected Future Exchange Rates by Trade Date
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